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RECENT DEVELOPIMENTS
counsel, has little sporting chance pitted against the knowledgeable and
practiced prosecuting attorney. In Norway, it has been the practice for
the past seventy years to allow every accused a defense counsel of his
choice at government expense in addition to providing the investigative
power of the police department to summon witnesses and gather evidence. 39
The due process and equal protection clauses are fluid and change with the
times and public opinion. Perhaps it will not be long before the three
hindrances mentioned above will have been totally eliminated.40
Richard C. Angino
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP-ARTISTIC
MERIT OF FILM AS WHOLE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDEEM
OBSCENE PARTS.
Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Regents (N.Y. 1964)
The Board of Regents of the State of New York directed the elimina-
tion of two scenes from a foreign film' as a condition for granting a license
to exhibit the picture. The scenes in question portrayed sexual relations,
the second being especially offensive because it showed bodily movements
and the woman's face registered "emotions concededly indicative of
orgasm." 2 Both were declared obscene under the state censorship statute.3
After the Board of Regents' determination was reversed by the Appellate
Division, it was reinstated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
distinguished the case from the earlier motion picture cases which were
successfully appealed to the United States Supreme Court,4 declaring that
the portrayal of sexual intercourse is conduct rather than speech and that
therefore it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the first and
fourteenth amendments. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Regents, 14 N.Y.2d
88, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964).
39. STANG, RETTERGANGSMAATEN I STROFFESAKER, 186-196 (1956).
40. United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
For a man is free only if, among other things, 'he is not liable to be . .. im-
prisoned without redress under an equal and impartial law .... Freedom is not
something which has to be safeguarded, but rather something to be extended.'
Freedom confined to the status quo cannot grow; and freedom which does not
grow tends to wither. Danger to democratic freedom lurks in the sentiment
"Come weal, come woe, my status is quo.' Id. at 574.
1. The film was a Swedish production entitled A Stranger Knocks.
2. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 90, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857,
858 (1964).
3. N.Y. Educ. Law § 122.
4. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 US. 684, 79 S.Ct. 1362 (1959);
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954) ; Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952).
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Freedom of speech and of the press are rights guaranteed by the first
amendment and protected against state infringement by the fourteenth
amendment.5 However, these rights are not absolute.6 Examples of un-
protected speech are criminal libel, fighting words7 and obscenity. The
instant case deals with obscenity, the basic and persisting problem in the
area being simply - what is obscenity. The struggle for a constitutional
definition of literary obscenity culminated in Roth v. United States.9 In
that decision the Supreme Court defined a work as obscene if it were
"utterly without redeeming social importance,"' 10 and if "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to prurient interest."" Prior
to the Roth case there was much confusion as to what the test should be.
Many courts, proceeding from the English case of Regina v. Hicklin,12
found obscenity even if an isolated passage had a prurient effect upon the
most susceptible of persons. When courts were faced with the question of
obscenity, there was no necessity for meeting the clear and present danger
test of Schenck. Obscenity does not fall within the ambit of free speech
at all; the Roth opinion informs us that since an obscene work has no
redeeming social value, its mere propensity to produce lustful thoughts
without any resulting action is enough to exclude such speech from con-
stitutional protection.
Shifting into the area of motion picture censorship, the Court has in
the past dealt with the problem in various ways; unfortunately, however,
it has struck down the censorship schemes 13 in every case14 but one, 15
never arriving at a test for filmed obscenity.' The basic problem is whether
5. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
6. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), wherein the
Court first used the clear and present danger exception to what otherwise would have
been constitutionally protected speech.
7. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957).
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 484, 77 S.Ct. at 1309.
11. Id. at 489, 77 S.Ct. at 1311.
12. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
[W]hether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprive and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort might fall.
13. Such schemes were invalidated following the court's decision in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952). Prior to that case motion pictures
were excluded from free speech protection by authority of Mutual Films Co. v. Indus.
Comm'r. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915), which was overruled by Burstyn.
14. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, 78 S.Ct. 115 (1957); Holmby
Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870, 76 S.Ct. 117 (1955); Superior Films v.
Dept. of Ed. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952).
15. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391 (1961).
16. The Court has not always dealt with the problem of obscenity. Burstyn, one
of the landmark cases which restricted the extent of movie censorship, also dealt with
the New York statute, but struck down censorship on the basis of sacrilege rather
than obscenity. It is interesting to note that the Court did not preclude censorship
completely in this case or any other case:
To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem.
[V'OL. 9
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the Roth standard for literature should be extended to motion pictures or
whether a different test is necessary because of their diverse natures.
Several cases have employed a Roth-like test including Amer. Civ. Lib.
Union v. Chicago,17 which was decided before the Roth decision; Excelsior
Pictures Corp. v. Chicago,18 and Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Chicago,10
which came after Roth. The first case was based on the similarity between
films and books while the graphic differences of the two were ignored;
the latter two depend on the first. 20 Thus these cases probably will not
have a conclusive effect on the Court when it finally does decide the issue.
Even in the famous Times Film Corp. v. Chicago2" case the Court gave
no indication of what standard will be used for films. Times merely held
that a Chicago ordinance, requiring submission of films for examination
by city officials as prerequisite to the granting of an exhibition license
was not void on its face as a prior restraint. The case was significant
in its own right since it held that the need for prior approval is not an
unconstitutional prior restraint..2 2 Even if licensing is of questionable con-
stitutionality, however, that does not answer the obscenity standard ques-
tion. For although Trans-Lux deals with such a licensing scheme, the
problem would still exist in the case of restrictions which occurred after
general release.
Motion pictures are of such a different nature from books that it is
submitted that the Roth test should not be extended to films. Even the
Burstyn case states that ". . . it [does not] follow that motion pictures are
necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar
problems. '23 The test outlined in the instant case should be accepted by
the Supreme Court. In an incisive opinion it shows why a film need not
have a dominant theme of obscenity in order to be obscene. The opinion
stresses the fact that motion pictures can be characterized as conduct rather
It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every
motion picture of every kind at all times and places. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
The problem as always is that the Court is reluctant to give more than broad hints
as to what the line of constitutionality will be. There are of course the persistent
challenges of Justices Black and Douglas to any censorship at all. They argue for
absolute freedom in this area. See Superior Films v. Dept. of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S.
587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954), concurring opinion.
17. 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954), dismissed in Supreme Court for want offinal judgment below, 348 U.S. 979, 75 S.Ct. 572 (1955).
18. 182 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. I1. 1960).
19. 184 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
20. They are distinguishable from the instant case. One deals with nudism and
the other merely with the use of the words "rape" and "contraceptive."
21. 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391 (1961).
22. This is attested to by the serious tenor of Chief Justice Warren's dissent in
which he charged that licensing and censorship before exhibition are not among the
very exceptional restrictions on free speech which are allowable, e.g., criminal libel
and fighting words. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631
(1931), ". . . the protection even as to previous restraints [is] not absolutely un-
limited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases." See also
6 VILL. L. Rgv. 567 (1961) ; 33 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 421 (1961) ; 1961 Wis. L. Rvv. 659.
23. 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
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than speech. The opinion extends the reasoning of Kingsley Internat.
Pictures Corp. v. Regents24 by stressing the manner of portrayal rather
than the communication of ideas. Actual conduct and filmed portrayal
are not identical and a
• . . meaningful comparison exists only in a narrow range of cases.
In most instances, the real conduct is illegal because of what is
accomplished by the person, as in murder, forgery, or adultery. In
such cases, the filmed dramatization obviously does not share the evil
aimed at in the law applicable to the real thing. Where, however,
the real conduct is illegal, not because of what is accomplished by
those involved, but simply because what is done if shocking, offensive
to see, and generally believed destructive of the general level of
morality, then a filmed simulation fully shares, it seems to me, the
evil of the original. In such cases the free expression protection of
the First Amendment must apply to both or neither. It makes no
sense at all to say that the conduct can be forbidden but not the
play or film. 25
This statement highlights the central problem; it brings force to the
subsequent conclusion that the free speech protection does not include
filmed obscenity. A filmed simulation of intercourse, for example, cannot
realistically be called speech; it is more analogous to conduct, and there-
fore need not meet the requirements of Roth.26 Hence one or two or more
particular scenes may be deleted by the censor even if the picture as a
whole could not be considered obscene.
The effect of a sensational scene upon a motion picture audience can
not be overemphasized. A few sensational descriptions in a book which
otherwise has artistic value will generally not have nearly as wide or as
strong an effect on the reading public. Pointedly put, an artistic work of
literature will generally have a smaller and a more mature audience
than a movie.
An argument is also made that movies should be treated differently
on the basis of a "clear and present danger." The graphic sensationalism
of filmed obscenity could well be very effective in stimulating unlawful
sexual behavior, which effect could provide the state with a lawful excuse
for censorship.
There have been alternative suggestions to deletion by censorship
such as restricting admission to objectionable movies to adults. The answer
to the problem may eventually be found in such an alternative; however,.
24. 360 U.S. 684, 702, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1372 (1959). That part of the New York
statute which provided that a movie may be denied a license on the ground that it
portrays certain acts of sexual immorality as acceptable or as a proper pattern of
behavior was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, because such was a restraint on the advocacy of ideas and that advocacy cannot
be restricted unless there is, for example, clear and present danger of incitement to
legally proscribed conduct.
25. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 93, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857,
861 (1964).
26. Id. at 96, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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